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We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a 
winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods. We follow the idea of 
issue ownership introduced by Petrocik (1996) in considering parties with different specialties. We show that the 
incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. The median voter is generally not indifferent 
between the two parties and, when she is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. This result 
holds when the parties’ main objective is to win the election and is compatible with a large range of candidates sub-
objectives, that may change from one election to the next. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more 
public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur. 
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Nous proposons un modèle de consommation publique à horizon infini. Les investissements engagés dans la 
fourniture de deux biens publics sont déterminés par les élections. Ces investissements créent un lien entre les 
élections successives. Nous suivons l’idée introduite par Petrocik (1996) selon laquelle les partis “possèdent” 
certains thèmes, en considérant qu’ils ont des spécialités différentes. Nous montrons que la part des voix du parti au 
pouvoir décroît entre deux élections. L’électeur médian n’est généralement pas indifférent entre les deux partis et, 
lorsqu’il est suffisamment modéré, aucun parti ne peut se maintenir indéfiniment au pouvoir. Ce résultat est valide 
lorsque l’objectif principal des partis est de gagner l’élection et est compatible avec un grand ensemble de sous 
objectifs, qui peuvent changer d’une élection à l’autre. Finalement, plus les partis sont spécialisés et plus les 
politiques ont des effets de long terme, plus les cycles politiques sont susceptibles d’apparaître. 
 




1 Presented to the International Game Theory congress, 2004, Stony Brook, New York, USA 
 In modern democracies, the alternation of political parties in power is
a frequent phenomenon. Why isn’t there a greater persistence of parties in
power ? How can one explain the turnover of parties in government ? How
can one explain political cycles ? We propose a theoretical model of political
cycles, where the share of a party’s vote decreases with the time it controls
government. This eﬀect, that we call “the opposition advantage”, is diﬀer-
ent from the well known incumbent eﬀect. Indeed, the incumbency eﬀect
measures the advantage given to the incumbent candidate competing with
a challenger. The opposition eﬀect measures the advantage of a candidate
aﬃliated to the opposition party, when he competes against a candidate of
the party in power, who is not necessarily the incumbent politician.
We propose an explanation of the opposition advantage and show that it
can be a cause for political and policy cycles. We propose an inﬁnite horizon
model of elections with two parties built on two main assumptions: policies
have long-term eﬀects1, but are not irreversible, and parties have comparative
advantages for the provision of two public goods (issue ownership). The two
goods are imperfectly substitutable for voters. For example, citizens need
good education and security at the same time. When voters are moderate,
they may wish that both parties govern, but they can only elect one of them
at a time. In this context, the opposition party can oﬀer more moderate
policies. Indeed, the opposition can propose to keep the incumbent party
policy long-term eﬀect and satisfy voters in focusing on the public good
that it has a comparative advantage upon. On the contrary, the party in
power cannot beneﬁt from the comparative advantage of the opposition party.
These two arguments suggest that the opposition party may be advantaged.
Our analysis has to be distinguished from studies focusing on politicians’
careers and swings in their popularity. A large strand of this literature deals
with the “Incumbency advantage”2. This theory is supported by overwhelm-
1Many public goods have long-term eﬀect. Important examples are national defense
activities, welfare programs, environmental clean-up, building states schools, roads ....
2Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) provide an excellent survey of the incumbency ad-
vantage literature, and an empirical contribution on state and federal elections in U.S. for
3ing evidence, both in Senate elections and in elections to the House of rep-
resentatives. Some of the major factors of the incumbency advantage are
redistricting3, seniority systems4, and the lack of collective responsibility5.
Scholars explain political cycles with psychological arguments6,t h em a i n
one being disappointment. The “Negativity eﬀect” theory7 is built on the
following remark: voters’ decisions are based on the incumbent’s past perfor-
mance and negative pieces of information have a greater impact than positive
pieces of information. There exist two diﬀerent explanations for this observa-
tion, the ﬁrst one suggests that voters have a high esteem for powerful ﬁgures
and are more easily disappointed than positively surprised by the government
performance; the second (Abelson and Levy, 1985) states that the electorate
has a strong risk aversion for potential costs of re-electing a politician who
has demonstrated his bad performance. In the light of the negativity eﬀect,
Aragones (1997) obtains a result of systematic alternation of the two par-
ties implementing diﬀerent policies. In our analysis, there is no uncertainty
and electorate decisions are not based on past performance, but as usually
in political models, for their preferred party at each election. Finally, the
negativity and incumbency eﬀects aﬀect the election outcome in opposing
directions. The ﬁrst one leads to the defeat of the incumbent, whereas the
the period 1942-2000. They ﬁnd strong support for the incumbency advantage in state
executives elections and conclude that explanations speciﬁc to the legislators incumbency
advantage are not convincing.
3Cox and Katz (2002) state that redistricting caused the rise of legislators incumbency
advantage after the 60s.
4McKelvey and Riezman (1992) argue that seniority tends to create a disincentive to
vote for challengers.
5See Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4) for a survey of the incumbents account-
ability literature.
6See Goertzel (2005) for a review of the American voters mood changes literature.
Schlesinger (1949, 1986, 1992) consider that the electorate is inevitably disappointed by
the party or the ideology that is in power. Klinberg (1952) suggests that American mood
in public opinion balances between introversion and extroversion. This could explain why
domestic and foreign concerns alternate through time and parties turnover in power.
7See Aragones (1997) for a survey.
4second one leads to the re-election of the incumbent. Both theories focus on
individual politicians. Diﬀerently, our study does not deal with politicians
but with parties.
In our model, political cycles emerge as a consequence of the opposition
eﬀect. There exists very few models considering this determinant of politi-
cal cycles. Kramer (1977) and Bendor, Mookherjee and Ray (2005), study
dynamic models of electoral competition between two parties with myopic
behavior. Kramer (1977) suppose that the incumbent cannot change his pol-
icy whereas the challenger can locate anywhere in the policy space. He shows
that candidates systematically alternate in power. Bendor, Mookherjee and
Ray (2005) propose a model based on a satisfycing behavior of the incumbent
and a search behavior of the challenger. If the winning candidate is satis-
ﬁed, then he does not change his policy until he loses the election, whereas
the challenger is not satisﬁed, then he searches a policy that can defeat the
incumbent. In our study, parties, once elected, are not constrained to keep
their policy the next election. Parties behave strategically, they try to win
the present election in selecting their platforms and their behavior do not
change whether they are in power or not.
Another topic related to our analysis are policy cycles. Many scholars
argue that policy cycles are generated by economic cycles8.W e p r o p o s e
a diﬀerent explanation;.in our model, policy cycles are not generated by
economic shocks but by the political structure. Since parties implement
diﬀerent policies9, political turnover and policy changes are clearly related.
In a very diﬀerent framework, Roemer (1995) shows that policy cycles arise
because of stochastic changes in voters preferences in a model with policy
motivated candidates with uncertainty. Our approach is diﬀerent in many
aspects. We suppose that parties are only oﬃce motivated and the non-
8A huge literature studies political business cycles. See Berry (1991) for a survey.
9Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982), and Chappel and Keech (1986) show that Democrat and
Republican governments have diﬀerent inﬂuences on the unemployment rate. Alesina
and Sachs (1988) and Tabellini and La Via (1989) show that parties are associated with
diﬀerent monetary policies.
5convergence of platforms does not result from uncertainty but from parties
multidimensional heterogeneity. Furthermore, we show that perpetual cycles
(but not necessarily periodic) appear in a context with no uncertainty.
In considering an inﬁnite number of successive elections and a dynamic
link coming from public policies long-term eﬀects, our work contributes to
the literature of inﬁnite horizon models of elections. This literature is mainly
focused on the dynamic ineﬃciency of government 10. Battaglini and Coate
(2005) consider an inﬁnite horizon model of collective spending and taxa-
tion. Public decisions are determined through a legislative bargaining pro-
cess. Agents are forward looking, they take decisions in anticipating the
outcomes of futures elections. The authors objective is very diﬀerent from
ours, because they concentrate on long-term government ineﬃciencies11.W e
do not analyze taxation and debt problems, then we suppose that the tax
rate is ﬁxed and that there is no saving and no debt.
Finally, we follow the empirical literature on the issue ownership theory of
voting12, initiated by Petrocik (1996), in supposing that candidates are more
able than their adversary to provide one of the two public goods. As stated
by Egan (2006): ”issue ownership refers to the idea that the Democrat and
Republican parties ”own” a set of issues which the public trusts the party
10Baron (1996) studies a dynamic model of pork barrel policies. Gomes and Jehiel
(2004) analyze the persistence of ineﬃciencies in a general framework of social and eco-
nomic interactions that can be applied to legislative bargaining, coalition formation or
exchange economies. Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) study public good provi-
sion in an OLG model, where an age-dependant taxation creates distortions in human
capital investment. Azzimonti, Sarte and Soares (2003) focus on the role of commitment
in a dynamic public spending and taxation model.
11In a close study, Azzimonti-Renzo (2005) analyzes government long-term ineﬃciencies
when the decision maker is atomistic.
12B´ elanger and Meguid (2005) show the importance of issue ownership and salience
with evidence from Canada, Egan (2006) shows the nonrepresentativeness eﬀect of issue
ownership, Holian (2004) study the dynamic of issue ownership, Puglisi (2006) shows
that the New York Times strategically gives emphasis to issues owned by Democrats or
over which Republicans are weak, and Petrocik et al. (2003) analyse issue ownership in
American presidential elections.
6as substantially better able to ”handle” than the other party. Democrats
are generally trusted more than Republicans on issues like the environment,
health care and social security; Republicans are more trusted on foreign pol-
icy and taxation”. Since we consider candidates with diﬀerent competences,
our work also contributes to the literature on valence in politics. A growing
literature deals with models where policy and quality are orthogonal dimen-
sions13. Here, we suppose that parties’ competences are diﬀerent according
to the diﬀerent policies. As noticed by Prat (2002): “One may doubt that
[voters] utility is separable in policy and valence. A left wing voter may pre-
fer an inept right-wing politician to an eﬀective right-wing politician because
the latter is more likely to live up to his or promises and pass right-wing leg-
islation. Still, an inept politician creates pure ineﬃciencies which are costly
to all citizens.”. Other authors analyze agency problems14, where politicians
are associated to a policy-dependent competence level and voters have in-
complete information on politicians type and/or actions15.W e e x t e n d t h e
assumption of heterogeneous competences to the case of two dimensions, but
we suppose that they are common knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we present voters behavior
and parties constraints. In section 2, we derive the multiple possible outcomes
of the electoral competition. In section 3, we show that the opposition party
is advantaged. In section 4, we present our main results: the probability
13This literature, initiated by Stokes (1992)focus on the problem of equilibrium existence
and platforms location in spatial models when candidates have diﬀerent “scores” on the
quality dimension. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) study the unidimensional model in
a world of certainty; Aragones and Palfrey (2002) analyze the case where candidates
maximize their share of votes and overcome the pure strategy equilibrium non-existence
problem in studying mixed strategy equilibrium for small advantage levels. Groseclose
(1999) and Aragones and Palfrey (2004) add candidates policy concerns.
14See again Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4, section 4.7) for a review of this
literature.
15Rogoﬀ and Siebert (1988) propose a model of adverse selection and Banks and Sun-
daram (1993, 1996) study politician accountability in models with moral hazard and ad-
verse selection.
7of winning cannot converge; when the median voter is extremist, a party
can stay in power for ever, whereas when he is moderate, no party can keep
power for ever; and we show that cycles are more likely to occur when the
depreciation rate is low and when parties are strongly specialized. In section
5, we discuss two candidates objectives (re-election concerns and rent-seeker
candidates). Finally, we conclude in section 6.
1 The model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon model of elections with two opportunistic
parties A and B. Each period, both parties commit themselves to imple-
ment a policy, voters elect a party and the new government implements his
platform. Then, another election takes place, and so on. The government
provides two durable public goods, a and b, that depreciate each period with
a constant rate δ in [0,1], and the government ’s budget is normalized to
1 at any period. A new government can either keep the existing stocks or
transform one of the public good into the other. Speciﬁcally, if the level of
public good g (g = a,b) after election t is gt and Ig,t+1 new units are produced
by the government in period t + 1, then the level in period t +1i s 16:
gt+1 =( 1− δ)gt + Ig,t+1, (1)
where g = a,b.T h el e v e lgt+1 can be either greater or smaller than gt.W h e n
gt+1 ≥ gt, this means that the government at time t + 1 chooses to keep the
stock of public good g.I fgt+1 <g t, the government either undoes or does
not invest enough in good g to maintain its level. A policy zt is a couple of
public goods quantities (at,b t).
Voters: Voters vote sincerely and diﬀer in the weight they place on the
two public goods. Voter i’s weight for the ﬁrst public good is denoted by αi,
16Azzimonti-Renzo (2005) and Battaglini and Coate (2005) make the same assumption
on the long-term eﬀect of public spending.
8belonging to the unit interval [0,1]. The preferences of voter i are represented
by:
Wi (at,b t)=αi ln(at)+( 1− αi)ln(bt), (2)
where at and bt are the public goods stocks after date t. The policy after
election t is noticed zt =( at,b t).
This kind of preferences, introduced by Tabellini and Alesina (1990), al-
lows voters to disagree about which quantities of public goods to consume.
Furthermore, these preferences belong to the class of ”intermediate prefer-
ences” deﬁned by Grandmont (1978), and verify the single crossing property
(Grandmont, 1978). The median voter theorem applies, i.e. the median
voter’s preferred policy is the unique Condorcet winner. The preferred pol-
icy of the median voter, characterized by αm, is thus the Condorcet winner
in our context.
It is important to notice that the identity of the median voter αm,d o e s
not depend on the date, i.e, is independent of the dynamics of the model.
Parties and issue ownership: At each period, both parties propose cred-
ible platforms in order to win the election. The government’s budget con-
straint is:
Ia,t + Ib,t ≤ 1, (3)
We deﬁne a party as a stable organization, which can provide the two pub-
lic goods. Following Petrocik’s (1996) idea of issue ownership, we suppose
that the two parties are ”specialized”: party A ”owns” issue a and party B
”owns” issue b. Formally, we suppose that A has a comparative advantage in
providing good a and party B a comparative advantage in providing good b.
This advantage will be captured by two constants, ηA ∈]1,η]a n dηB ∈]1,η]
which are inversely related to the marginal cost of providing the public goods.
Finally, we suppose that the technology for providing both public goods has
constant returns to scale, with marginal costs of 1/ηA and 1 for party A and
1a n d1 /ηB for party B. With these speciﬁcations in mind, we write the
budget constraints of the two parties at an election at date t as:
9Party A:
at − (1 − δ)at−1
ηA + bt − (1 − δ)bt−1 ≤ 1, (A)
Party B:
at − (1 − δ)at−1 +
bt − (1 − δ)bt−1
ηB ≤ 1, (B)
where stocks of the two public goods must be positive, i.e., at,b t ≥ 0. In-
equality (A) deﬁnes party A’s set of policy A(t) and inequality (B) deﬁne
party B’s set of policy B(t).
2 Political Equilibria
2.1 The median voter choice
Each election has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, parties announce credi-
ble promises and in the second stage voters cast their ballot. We consider
subgame perfect equilibria17 of this game, given the stocks of public goods.
Since voters’ preferences verify the single crossing property, the median voter
selects the winning party, and her choice drives the dynamics of successive
elections. Indeed, this property ensures that for any pair of policies, the me-
dian voter preferred policy is also preferred by a majority of voters. Hence,
the median voter behavior determines the outcome of the election. We start
the analysis by deriving her preferred platform over the set of platforms. The
median voter’s preferred policy over A(t), denoted mA
t is the solution to:
Max
(at,bt)
[Wi (at,b t)] (MA)
s.t. :( at,b t) ∈ A(t)
17In considering subgame perfect equilibria and then voters as players, we can conclude
that the set of winning strategies is always a closed set.
10and her preferred platform over B(t), denoted mB
t is the solution to:
Max
(at,bt)
[Wi (at,b t)] (MB)
s.t. :( at,b t) ∈ B(t)









































Hence, the derivation of the median voter’s preferred platform depends
on the public goods stocks at−1 and bt−1. She has to compare mA
t and mB
t .










The median voter weakly prefers mA
t to mB











. With simple computations, one can show that the median voter
weakly prefers mA
t to mB
t if and only if Λt (αm) ≥ 1. Not surprisingly, the
more A is competent, the less B is competent, and the more αm is high, the
higher the likelihood that the median voter chooses a policy in A’s policy
set.
2.2 Equilibria
Each election presents two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, parties select their plat-
forms in order to win the election. Party A (respectively party B) maximizes
is probability of victory πA
t (respectively πB
t ). In the second stage, voters vote
for their preferred candidate. Since voters preferences verify the single cross-
ing property and voters are sincere, the second stage allow to solve the case
where the median voter is indiﬀerent between the two programs. We denote
11by zA
t party A’s platform and by zB
t party B’s platform in the election at date
t.L e tMA(t) (respectively MB(t)) be the set of party A platforms strictly
preferred to mB






















Since parties are only interested in winning the election, a platform that the
rival cannot defeat is an equilibrium strategy. This leads to a multiplicity of
subgame perfect Nash equilibria, summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is always non
empty and is given by:
(i) MA(t)×B(t) and the median voter votes for A if Λt > 1, and A is elected,







× MB(t) and the median voter votes for A (and then A wins);
MA(t) ×mB
t and the median voter votes for B (and then B wins) if Λt =1 .
(Proofs are reported in the appendix.)
These results lead to several observations. First, because parties only
want to win the election and the information is complete, one party is in
general certain to be elected (in cases (i) and (ii)). This party can propose
many winning platforms, whereas the loser locates anywhere in his policy
set. Figure 4.1 illustrates this kind of equilibrium.
Second, in very speciﬁc circumstances (in case (iii)), the median voter is
indiﬀerent between the two parties (see Figure 4.2) and the subgame perfect
Nash equilibria can support both parties’ victory. If this event occurs, it will







































































Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies when Λt =1
3 The opposition advantage
In this section, we discuss about the advantage conferred to the party in the
opposition. Consider two elections at dates t and t + 1, and suppose that B








MB(t), one of his equilibrium platform for election t. Since B is the winner,
it is necessarily true that Λt ≤ 1. First remark that zB
t / ∈ A(t) because of
the deﬁnitions of MB(t)a n dmA
t , so that zB
t must satisfy
aB
t − (1 − δ)at−1
ηA + b
B
t − (1 − δ)bt−1 > 1, (9)
This simply means that if A would try to imitate B at election t,t h e nh e







. This last equation can be then rewritten as follows:
s
A




t ∈ B(t), so that:
a
B
t − (1 − δ)at−1 +
bB
t − (1 − δ)bt−1




t − 1 ≤ (1 − δ)s
B
t−1. (12)



















t−1, only because sA
t and sB
t are
strictly greater than 1. Finally, the relative advantage of party A is strictly
greater at election t + 1 than at election t. This result is summarized in the
next proposition:
Proposition 2 At each election, the relative advantage of the opposition
party increases: for all t where A is the opposition party, Λt+1 > Λt.
(Proof: see the reasoning above.)
This result states that the share of votes of the opposition party generally
increases from one election to the next. The intuition of this result is that
14when a party is elected, since he must implement his promises, he gives the
opposition party the opportunity to propose a more satisfactory platform on
both dimensions. This eﬀect drives the dynamics of elections and, when it
is suﬃciently large, can lead to a switch in power between the majority and
the minority.
4 Political Cycles
In this section, we study the dynamics of elections and public good provision.
The questions arising at this point are: What is the long run behavior of
the dynamics of elections ? May elections outcomes be durably unknown?
How do cycles depend on the median voter preferences ? On the parties
competences ? On the durability of public goods? In this section, we answer
these questions and illustrate the results with simulations of the dynamic.
4.1 May elections outcomes be durably unknown?
We focus on the special case (iii), where the winner is unknown in election k.
We have shown that the sequence (Λt)t is increasing when A is not in power,
and, by symmetry, is decreasing when A is in power. Then, the sequence is
either always increasing and then for all t,Λ t ≤ 1, always decreasing and for
all t,Λ t ≥ 1, or follows a cycle.
This sequence is not stable for Λt = 1. Indeed, suppose that there exists
an election k such that Λk =1 . Then each party has one half chance of
being elected in k. Without loss of generality, suppose that A is elected,
then Λk+1 < Λk =1 , and party B is elected for sure in k + 1. The following
corollary of proposition 2 summarizes this result:
Corollary 1 If Λk =1 , the elected party in k is defeated in k +1 .
(The proof relies on the simple argument above.)
The intuition of this result is that, when the median voter is indiﬀerent
between both platforms (Λk = 1), he would indeed like both platforms to
15be implemented in turn18. But only one party is elected, and provides a
polarized platform. At the next election, the opposition party will provide
a policy which uses the stock of public goods implemented by the majority,
but is closer to the median voter’s preferences.
4.2 Stable power
The following proposition provides suﬃcient conditions for a party to con-
stantly remain in power.






2 ×]1,η]2 × R2
+:
(i) If αm ∈ [0,α], then party B wins all elections,
(ii) If αm ∈ [α,1], then party A wins all elections.
(Proof: see the appendix)
The intuition of this result is straightforward. If the median voter has
extreme tastes, then one of the two parties is able to keep power forever by
exploiting its comparative advantage in providing one of the two policies.
4.3 Cycles
We now analyze cycles where parties alternate in power. We wish to know
when these cycles are not conjunctural, namely, when they are independent
of the initial stocks of public good, a0 and b0.We deﬁne political cycles in the
following way:







+, exhibits political cycles if and only if no party wins an inﬁnite number
of consecutive elections.
18The intuition is close to Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) at the diﬀerence that, in our
model, voters cannot mix policies during a unique mandate, but they get mixed policies
through successive mandates with parties turnover.
16Formally, we study the case where the sequence (Λt)t does not converge
and does not diverge. Unfortunately, because there exist many equilibria at
each election, we cannot give necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the set
of parameters such that it exhibits political cycles. However, we propose a
suﬃcient condition for the existence of political cycles:





+, there exist α1 <
α2 both in [0,1], such that: if αm ∈ [α1,α 2] no party can maintain itself
indeﬁnitely in power.
Example 1: Suppose (for simplicity) that the elected party implements
the median voter preferred program. Consider the following numerical ex-
ample: ηA,ηB =1 .1, a0 = b0 =0 ,δ =0 .6, αm =0 .515 (the median voter
prefers good a to good b). The following ﬁgure represents the dynamic of the
two public goods stocks and the election winner for the 20 ﬁrst elections:
Figure 3: Political Cycles
This example illustrates well the dynamic of Political Cycles. Initially,
both the public goods quantities are identical. Since the median voter prefers
public good a, he elects party A until he has enough of good a (8 times in
17this example). When the quantity of good a becomes high enough (relatively
to the quantity of b), he doesn’t need more a and wishes to have a higher
quantity of b. Hence he changes his vote and elects party B. Thereafter, he
changes his vote in all election for similar reasons.
4.4 Comparative statics
Since there exist many equilibria, it seems complicated to provide general
comparative statics. To give an insight into the inﬂuence of the deprecia-
tion rate and the candidates competences on political cycles we suppose, for
simplicity, that the winning candidate always implements the median voter
preferred platform19,t h a ti smA
t (respectively mB
t ) when candidate A (re-
spectively candidate B) wins the election t. Furthermore, we consider the
simple case where ηA = ηB = η, i.e. when candidates are equally compe-
tent in their respective specialties. Under these assumptions, we obtain the
following comparative statics results:
Proposition 5 The interval [α1,α 2] (of maximal size) deﬁned in Proposition
4 is unique and,




∂ (α2 − α1)
∂δ
< 0. (15)
The higher the specialization of parties, the larger the parameter range
for which political cycles occur. When parties become more specialized, they
implement more extreme policies and the median voter is more willing to
switch in order to see the other good provided. When the depreciation rate
increases, goods have shorter eﬀects and voters need less power turnover.
19The median voter preferred platform is always an equilibrium platform for the winning
candidate.
185 Extensions: parties’ lexicographic prefer-
ences
The results presented in the precedent sections hold without specifying the
choice of an elected party among the generally large set of winning policies.
We now allow parties to select one policy in order to maximize a sub-objective
function. In other words, parties of lexicographic preferences: they ﬁrst want
to be elected, and select among the winning platforms that platform which













































































Suppose that parties want to be re-elected, and consider the following re-
duced form for a long-run, non myopic behavior of political parties. At the
election at date t, the winning party’s subobjective is to maximize his rel-
ative advantage in the next election, that is Λt+1 for party A, and 1
Λt+1 for
party B. A party ﬁrst wishes to be elected, and then to create the most
favorable conditions for its re-election. If Λt = 1, then equilibrium programs







But, if Λt  =1 , for example Λt > 1, then party A can choose many winning
























19Intuitively, since Λt+1 is decreasing in at and increasing in bt, party A will
choose a program with a minimum of good a and a maximum of good b.
The following result describe the equilibrium strategy of the winning party
(A without loss of generality):
Proposition 6 Λt+1 admits a unique maximum over MA(t) and there ex-
ists a unique corresponding program with a minimum quantity of a and a
maximum quantity of b.
(The Proof is in the appendix)
This result suggests that parties seeking re-election choose very ineﬃcient
platforms, because they do not fully exploit their comparative advantage.
The intuition is that a party has to provide some of the public good that he
is not competent at producing, in order to induce voters to reelect him next
period. Figure 4.3 illustrates this ineﬃcient platform, denoted zA





































Figure 4: When candidate A has re-election concerns and Λt > 1
20The implemented policy is not computable for every values of αm.F o r -
tunately, we are able to compute this program for the case where αm = 1
2
20.





= 1, the implemented





We propose to illustrate the elections dynamics with the following simulated
example:
Example 2: We plot the evolution of the public goods stocks and the
winning candidate (for election 13 to 44), with: αm =0 .5, ηA =2 ,ηB =2 .1,
δ =0 .69 and a0 = b0 =0 .
Figure 5: Dynamic with re-election seekers candidates
20Let αm = 1
2. The winner (with re-election concerns) equilibrium program is given by:























































































with αm = 1
2
21In this example, candidate B is advantaged since ηB >η A. Candidate B
uses this advantage and can sometimes stay in power more than one legisla-
ture (two or three) in a row, whereas candidate A cannot (in this example)
maintain himself in power longer than one legislature.
5.2 Rent-seeker candidates
The results of previous sections also hold when the candidates’ sub-objective
is to extract rents from power. Formally, if A wins the election, he chooses






























In equilibrium, parties rents amount (if elected) are given by:








t−1 is the maximum of rA
t
over MA(t),
(ii) If Λt ≤ 1,r B∗
t =( 1− Λt)sB
t−1 is the maximum of rB
t over MB(t).
Then, the higher the relative advantage of candidate A (Λt), the higher
the rents he can extract. Figure 4.4 illustrates this result, where candidate
A’s equilibrium platform is denoted zA
t :
Furthermore, notice that we know from Proposition 2, that Λt+1 < Λt.
Hence, if A wins the election at t and t+1 , we obtain that rA∗
t+1 <r A∗
t .T h i s
would suggest that the longer a party is in power, the smaller the rents he
can extract. We have to be cautious with this observation because of prob-




































Figure 6: When candidate A is rent-seeker and Λt > 1
promises, an incumbent who is certain to lose the next election will extract
all the rents from power. Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4) discusses
this issue and provides a survey of the relevant literature.
Computing parties equilibrium programs lead to conclude that the imple-
mented policy in election t is:
Corollary 8 The winner party (rent-seeker) equilibrium program is given
by:










t−1 (1 − αm)
Λt
 










t−1 (1 − αm)Λ t
 
(This results is directly deduced from the proof of Proposition 7)
As the policies implemented when candidates have re-election concerns, the
policies implemented when parties are rent-seekers are very ineﬃcient. Fur-
thermore, when no party is advantaged (Λt = 1) these policies are also iden-
tical to the median voter preferred programs.
Now, a natural issue would be to compare the two dynamics, when parties
23have re-election concerns and when they are rent-seeker. First, does re-
election concerned candidates implement more or less eﬃcient policies than
rent-seekers candidates? The answer is ambiguous. Indeed, the median voter
is indiﬀerent between a rent and a re-election seeker candidate, because each
of them oﬀers a suﬃciently higher quantity of one of the two public goods
than the other one.
Second, how does the evolution of public goods is inﬂuenced by candidates’
objective? We propose to illustrate the elections dynamics with the same
data as in example 2:
Example 3: We plot the evolution of the public goods stocks and give the
winning candidate (for election 13 to 44) with the same data as in Example
2: αm =0 .5, ηA =2 ,ηA =2 .1, δ =0 .69 and a0 = b0 =0 .
Figure 7: Dynamic with rent-seeker candidates
Not surprisingly, compared to the re-election seekers case, there seems to
be more frequent alternations when candidates are rent-seekers.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have considered an inﬁnite horizon dynamic model of public consump-
tion with durable public goods. We have shown that the longer a party keeps
24power, the more the opposition is likely to come back to power. Therefore,
we have been able to show that policy and political cycles can occur, when
the median voter preferences are balanced enough between the public goods
provided by the two parties. This result holds when the parties’ main objec-
tive is to win the election and is compatible with a large range of candidates
sub-objectives, that may change from one election to the next. In particular,
we have shown that a candidate seeking re-election will choose a very ineﬃ-
cient platform, providing the minimal quantity of the public good in which
he has a comparative advantage.
257 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) If Λt > 1, by deﬁnition, the median voter strictly prefers mA
t than
mB
t . Hence, mA
t ∈ MA (t)  = ∅.L e t zA
t ∈ MA (t)a n dzB























(1,0) and no party has an incentive to deviate. In case of egality, the median
voter is indiﬀerent between both policies zA
t and zA
t . If she votes for party
B,t h e nA has an incentive to deviate, to choose, for example, mA
t and wins






=( 1 ,0) and no party has an incentive to deviate.
We conclude that MA (t)×B(t) ⊂ E(t). Now, choose zA











.I nt h i sc a s eπA
t < 1, then party A has an incentive to
move and play, for example, mA
t . (ii) The reasoning is the same as for point (i)














t ∈ B(t) and the median voter votes for A. Then,
(πA
t ,πB
t )=( 1 ,0) and no party has a strict incentive to deviate. The median











Hence, this is a subgame perfect equilibrium (the situation with A and B
inverted is also a SPE). There is no other SPE. Indeed, suppose zA





























,t h e np a r t y
B has an incentive to change its program and to choose, for example, mB
t .
Doing so, in the second stage, the median voter chooses to vote for B.
Proof of Proposition 3:

































  > 1w h e nαm =1 . Then,
there exists a unique value of αm, denoted   αt, such that Λt =1:










Since this is true for all t, there exist 0 <α< α<1, such that for all t :
α <   αt < α,
Finally, if 0 ≤ αm ≤ α, then, for all t, Λt < 1, and B wins. If α ≤ αm ≤ 1,
then, for all t, Λt > 1, then A wins.
Proof of Proposition 4:




t > (1 − δ)s
A




t ≤ (1 − δ)s
B
t−1 +1 . (20)
Claim 1: We claim that there exists k such that for all t ≥ k, B wins the




t > (1 − δ)
t−k s
A
k + t − k, (21)
s
B
t ≤ (1 − δ)
t−k s
B
k + t − k. (22)








k + t − k
(1 − δ)
t−k sB
k + t − k
,
Since B wins forever after k, then for all t>k ,Λt ≤ 1. Furthermore (Λt)t is









Hence, since (1 − δ) < 1,





27Then, there exists a real number 0 <ε 1 < 1, such that a necessary condition
for Claim 1 is:









Claim 2: We claim that there exists k such that for all t ≥ k, A wins the
election t. Then for all t>k ,Λt ≥ 1. By an argument symmetric to that of
Claim 1, (Λt)t converges to   Λ, and there exists a real number 0 <ε 2 < 1,
such that a necessary condition for Claim 2 is:






















then   Λ < 1 <   Λ, and Claim 1 and 2 are contradictory, so that no party can
win an inﬁnite number of consecutive elections. Then there exist α1 <α 2
such that no party can win an inﬁnite number of consecutive elections.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Claim 1: There exists k such that for all t ≥ k, B wins the election t.










t+1 =1+( 1− δ)
 










t+1 =1+( 1− δ)s
B
t .













Hence, Λt converges to:
  Λ(αm)=
 








28By Proposition 2, (Λt)t increases and we obtain that Claim 1 is equivalent
to   Λ(αm) ≤ 1. The inequality is weak, because by Corollary 2 Λt cannot
attain its limit when   Λ(αm)=1 .L e tfB (αm)=  Λ(αm)−1, then Claim 1i s
equivalent to fB (αm) ≤ 0. Now we turn to the symmetric Claim for party
A:
Claim 2: There exists k such that for all t ≥ k, A wins the election t.
With the same arguments as those of Claim 1, we obtain that (Λt)t,w h i c h
is now decreasing, converges to:
  Λ(αm)=
1






And Claim 2i se q u i v a l e n tt o  Λ(αm) ≥ 1. Let fA (αm)= 1
  Λ(αm) − 1, then
Claim 2i se q u i v a l e n tt ofA (αm) ≤ 0. Furthermore,
f














0w h e nαm =0a n dδ (1 − η) < 0w h e nαm = 1. Hence, fA (αm) as a unique













2.O b s e r v e t h a t fA (1 − αm)=fB (αm), then fB (αm) has a unique
root α1 <α 2. Finally, Claim 1a n dClaim 2 are both contradicted if and
only if αm ∈ [α1,α 2].
Now we can turn to the comparative statics. α2 is implicitly deﬁned as a
function of δ and η by:
δη +( 1− δ)
 




2α2 =0 , (23)







2α2−1 − δ − 2α2 (1 − δ)η,
29and,







It is easy to verify that ∂N
∂δ =2 α2η − 1 > 0 because α2 > 1











∝ (1 − δ)(η)
2(1−α2) − (1 + 2α2 lnη),
Let g (α2)=( 1− δ)(η)
2(1−α2)−(1 + 2α2lnη), then g  (α2) < 0. Since g(1) =
−δ − 2α2 lnη,t h e n∂D











1+( η2 − 1)α2 − η
D
,
Here, the numerator of the right-hand side is increasing in α2 and is equal
to (η − 1)
2 when α2 =
1




Proof of Proposition 6:




























30where µ = at
ηAsA
t−1 ∈ [0,1]. Here Λt > 1, and, by proposition 3, αm > 0. The
right-hand side of (24) is null when µ = 0 and equal to 1 when µ = αm.
Thus 24 admits a solution. If αm = 1, then the right-hand side is strictly
decreasing in µ, and the solution is unique. If αm < 1, then the right-hand
side is concave in µ,i sn u l lw h e nµ = 0 or 1, and maximal when µ = αm.
Thus 24 has two diﬀerent solutions. Hence, the set of solutions is ﬁnite, then

























is the unique solution to this maximization problem.
Proof of Proposition 7: (i) It is simple to verify that the median voter’s
preferred program in A(t) when candidate A extracts a rent rA















. Then, the median voter weakly
prefers   zA
t to mB












(ii) Symmetrically, the median voter preferred platform in B(t), when candi-
date B extracts a rent rB
















Then, the median voter weakly prefers   zB
t to mA
t if and only if:
r
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